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21 
Beyond Stamp Collecting: Ronald Coase and 
“Scientific” Legal Scholarship 
John N. Drobak

 
Ronald Coase, the Nobel laureate whose work is part of the 
foundation of modern law and economics, frequently quoted the 
British physicist Ernest Rutherford for the proposition that all science 
is either physics or stamp collecting.
1
 Coase would add that the same 
is also true for all social science—it is either physics or stamp 
collecting, and most legal scholarship has been stamp collecting.
2
 I 
would like to use this Essay to demonstrate two propositions: I would 
like to praise stamp collecting; but I would also like to show that 
legal scholarship has been physics long before Coase made his 
comments. 
By stamp collecting, Coase meant the organization and 
classification of things—or as he put it, operating a filing system.3 A 
good part of the natural sciences has always involved classification 
and organization. The study of our planet and research about living 
organisms have depended upon adding to organized data. Geology, 
 
 
  George Alexander Madill Professor of Real Property & Equity Jurisprudence, 
Washington University School of Law, & Professor of Economics (Curtesy Appointment), 
School of Arts & Sciences, Washington University. This Essay expands and updates the lecture 
given by Professor Drobak upon his installation to the Madill Chair on February 27, 2002, at 
Washington University.  
 1. Ernest Rutherford, who died in 1937, made this statement during his lectures. It was 
not recorded. “[T]he epigram attributed to the late Sir Ernest Rutherford [is] that science 
consists only of ‘physics and stamp-collecting.’” Max Black, A Lend-Lease Program for 
Philosophy and Science, 61 SCI. MONTHLY 165, 168 (1945).  
 2. Coase frequently made these remarks in his lectures. He wrote the following in an 
essay in praise of the law and economics program at the University of Chicago:  
Ernest Rutherford said that science is either physics or stamp collecting, by which he 
meant, I take it, that it is either engaged in analysis or in operating a filing system. 
Much, and perhaps most, legal scholarship has been stamp collecting. Law and 
economics, however, is likely to change all that and, in fact, has begun to do so.  
Ronald Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1993).  
 3. Id. 
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biology, and medicine are fields in which classifications are essential. 
Physics depends on classifying and ordering data in order to find 
patterns and irregularities. The periodic table, an important part of 
chemistry and other natural sciences, is one of the greatest 
classification schemes of all time. Over the past few decades, 
genome-sequencing projects—which are technologically advanced 
filing systems—have been crucial to research in the life sciences.  
A good part of the law and legal scholarship qualifies as stamp 
collecting. Although purely doctrinal scholarship has been decreasing 
in both prestige and publication by elite journals for decades,
4
 there is 
still much writing that analyzes cases by ordering them with other 
cases, even scholarship that some might consider non-doctrinal 
because they use methods from other disciplines to analyze cases. 
Contrary to Coase’s implication, this is a desirable result. 
Classification is a way to bring order to what would otherwise be 
chaos. Even more importantly, classification permits reasoning by 
analogy, one of the primary types of legal analysis. With scores of 
cases relevant to an issue, coherent legal analysis would be 
impossible without some way to organize the cases. 
Let me give two examples of how classification brings order to 
the law. Probably the best-known instance involves estates in land. 
Present interests in land include fee simple, fee tail, defeasible fees, 
life estates, and leaseholds. Under what is referred to as numerus 
clausus, the laws of the United States and European civil law 
countries limit new forms of ownership, in contrast to the variation 
and novelty of contracts allowed under contract law.
5
 The limitations 
on the forms of land ownership decrease the transaction costs of real 
estate transactions, which in turn provide social and economic 
benefits.  
Classification is also important to antitrust law. In trying to clarify 
the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court gradually 
developed a dual classification of restraints on trade, characterizing 
 
 4. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 56–57 (2012). 
 5. Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). 
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some as per se illegal while judging others under the rule of reason.
6
 
This stamp collecting simplified the litigation of the most pernicious 
restraints like price fixing and market division agreements among 
competitors. Not only did this classification scheme reduce 
enforcement costs, it also gave clear signals to firms about the kinds 
of conduct to avoid.  
As the economy became more complex, a dual classification 
system proved to be too inflexible for some cases, prompting the 
Supreme Court to make additional modifications. It crafted a middle 
category (called the “modified per se” rule) for a limited number of 
specialized agreements, established a subcategory of the rule of 
reason (the “quick look” rule of reason) for certain restraints that 
appear anticompetitive on initial examination, and created a formal 
process for funneling agreements into the appropriate category.
7
 The 
end result is a classification scheme with four categories and a 
funneling rule that makes it much easier to analyze the thousands of 
different types of economic agreements with a good degree of 
predictability. Without a scheme like this, the law of the Sherman Act 
would be uncertain and chaotic.
8
 
Since both property law and antitrust law require classifications, it 
naturally follows that much legal scholarship in these fields would 
analyze the process of classification and the utility of the 
classifications themselves.
9
 This type of legal scholarship is stamp 
 
 6. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 79, 
692 (1978). 
 7. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (quick look 
rule of reason); Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 
(1985) (modified per se rule); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
441 U.S. 1 (1976) (funneling process).  
 8. The “quick look” rule of reason permits somewhat of a sliding scale in judging 
reasonableness, Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013), 
leading some scholars to see an evolution in the section 1 classification scheme into a spectrum 
rather than discrete standards. See, e.g., Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A 
Critique of the Rule of Reason in Antitrust Analysis, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP FIN. L. 591, 661 
(2012) (“Most observers agree that the Court dismantled the boundaries between categories of 
conduct in favor of a continuum; that ‘quick look’ and ‘full blown’ are merely part of a 
continuum between per se illegality at one end and efficient or competitively neutral conduct at 
the other.”).  
 9. See, e.g., Allison Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Power of Termination—
Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 215 (1953); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a 
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collecting, but it is also useful scholarship that benefits lawyers and 
judges and advances our understanding of the case law. Although 
doctrinal scholarship has a bad name with many scholars these days, 
much of doctrinal scholarship has done more than organize cases in a 
filing system. In discussing the different approaches under conflicting 
cases, doctrinal scholars throughout the twentieth century have 
considered such aspects as creating incentives, fulfilling expectations, 
and recognizing the relevance of good faith and morality in 
advocating the approach of one line of cases over another.
10
 Recent 
doctrinal scholarship continues that tradition.
11
 
Before I explain why much legal scholarship is physics as Coase 
and Rutherford use the term, I want to say a little about science. 
There is far from any universal agreement about what makes 
something a science rather than part of the arts or the humanities. In 
my mind, science is a spirit of investigation and learning that 
attempts to advance our understanding of the world. At its core, it 
requires a search for theories and fundamental principles. Science 
also entails the rigorous use of methods in a collective enterprise, in 
which researchers build upon the works of those who came earlier. It 
is this collective, rigorous search for theories and underlying 
principles that distinguishes science from the arts and the 
humanities.
12
 
 
Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in Antitrust Analysis, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 591 (2012). 
 10. An example of this type of doctrinal scholarship is a note from 1938 that resolves the 
problem of circularity of mortgages (in which there is no priority of competing mortgages under 
standard principles) by trying to fulfill expectations and create incentives. Note, Circularity of 
Liens—A Proposed Solution, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1267 (1938). George Priest has described this 
type of scholarship as “reflecting a partial economic basis.” George L. Priest, The Growth of 
Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A 
Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1933 (1993).  
 11. Just to take one author as an example, Richard Helmholz, who is one of the 
preeminent legal historians of our age, has written three doctrinal articles concerning property 
law in which he examines the non-doctrinal factors that drive court outcomes. See Richard H. 
Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of 
Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97 (1992); Richard H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of 
Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1221 (1985); Richard H. Helmholz, 
Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331 (1983). 
 12. ROBERTA CORVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT OF KARL POPPER 42, 125 
(Patrick Camiller trans., 1997); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 1, 23 (Otto Neurath et al. eds., 1970); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/9
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Social science is as much science as natural science. Prior to the 
nineteenth century, few would have distinguished natural from social 
science. As Friedrich Hayek has written:  
During the first half of the nineteenth century . . . [t]he term 
science came more and more to be confined to the physical and 
biological disciplines which at the same time began to claim 
for themselves a special rigorousness and certainty which 
distinguished them from all others. Their success was such that 
they soon came to exercise an extraordinary fascination on 
those working in other fields, who rapidly began to imitate 
their teaching and vocabulary. Thus the tyranny commenced 
which the methods and techniques [of the natural sciences] 
have ever since exercised over the other subjects. [Social 
scientists] became increasingly concerned to vindicate their 
equal status by showing that their methods were the same as 
those of their successful sisters rather than by adapting their 
methods more and more to their own particular problems . . . . 
[T]his ambition to imitate [natural] Science in its methods 
rather than its spirit has now dominated social [science].
13
 
Hayek wrote these remarks over sixty years ago, but they ring just as 
true today. Mathematics dominates economics. Quantitative methods 
are becoming dominant in political science. That is fine, so long as 
the methods are used in the search for theories and underlying 
principles, and not just in a glitzy demonstration of method. Robert 
Fogel, a Nobel laureate in economics, has emphasized that not all 
mathematics is theory and that not all theory is mathematics. Noting 
the fascination with economic theories that are “intellectually 
elegant,” Fogel wrote that “abstract models [are not] an end in 
 
Derek J. de Solla Price, Of Sealing Wax and String, 93 NAT. HIST. 48, 49–56 (1984); Thomas 
S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in 
the Study of the Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875 (2003).  
 13. F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF 
REASON 20–21 (1952) (Liberty Fund ed. 1979) To go back even further in time, law was the 
first subject (as part of theology) to be studied scientifically in European universities. Physics 
was a relative latecomer. WALTER ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 79 (1975). 
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themselves, but a basis for arriving at valid generalizations about how 
some aspects of the economy actually worked.”14 
It is important to remember that natural scientists have the luxury 
of being able to isolate their experiments from the complexity of the 
real world. This difference makes some of the methods of natural 
science inappropriate for various types of research in the social 
sciences. Without the luxury of being able to isolate and study one 
variable in an experiment disconnected from the complexity of the 
world, research in social science is less verifiable, which gives results 
that are more subject to skepticism than findings in the natural 
sciences. But this does not make the social sciences any less of a 
science than natural science. It is only a different kind of science.
 
 
There is research in some of the natural sciences that suffer the 
same problems of social science when it takes place outside a 
controlled laboratory. For example, research in the life sciences can 
be chaotic and unpredictable. Meteorology must involve similar 
problems both because it is so difficult to study the weather in 
isolation and because the weather is so chaotic. 
The notion that legal scholarship is part of the social sciences is 
not novel. Richard Posner traces the roots of interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship to “[t]he late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to 
Bentham’s utilitarian (essentially economic) theory of criminal 
punishment and in Savigny’s historicist conception of legal science, 
which influenced Holmes, [and then] to Max Weber.”15 When Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote in 1887 that “[t]he life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience,”16 he was directing us to look at how 
the law interacted with society. His great work, The Common Law, 
was based on anthropology, as well as legal history.
17
 Roscoe Pound, 
in his book Spirit of the Common Law, published in 1921, expressly 
called for “sound theories” explaining both the law’s origination and 
its effects on society. In comparing the jurists of the nineteenth 
century with those of the early twentieth century, Pound wrote: 
 
 14. Robert W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Economic Theory, in THE FRONTIERS OF 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 13, 15 (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., 1997).  
 15. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 3 (2001). 
 16. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1887). 
 17. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/9
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In the past century we studied law from within. The jurists of 
today are studying it from without. . . . Where the last century 
studied law in the abstract, they insist upon study of the actual 
social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines. . . . 
Where the last century held comparative law the best 
foundation for wise lawmaking, they hold it not enough to 
compare the laws themselves, but that even more their social 
operation must be studied and the effects which they produce 
. . . . Such is the spirit of the twentieth-century jurisprudence.
18
 
When Coase labeled legal research as stamp collecting rather than 
physics in the late twentieth century, he overlooked this history of 
scholarship that involved a search for theory with the application of 
ideas and methods from other disciplines.
19
 Interdisciplinary 
scholarship was so prevalent by 1992 that it prompted Judge Harry T. 
Edwards to question the desirability of the direction of legal 
research.
20
 Over the last forty years, economics has had the greatest 
impact on legal analysis. This century has seen related fields, like 
finance theory, public choice theory, and game theory, influence the 
law.
21
 Empirical analysis is now a well-established sub-discipline in 
the law. Cognitive science and behavioral psychology are increasing 
in importance. Legal scholars seem to be combing the halls of the 
other social sciences looking for the methodology or techniques that 
can make them just as famous as neo-classical price theory made 
Richard Posner.  
Law professors do not invent the social science methods they 
apply to legal analysis. Rather they borrow ideas, methods, and 
techniques from the other social sciences.
22
 That fact does not make 
 
 18. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 212 (1921). 
 19. Other examples from the twentieth century include the use of economic analysis in the 
study of utility ratemaking, see, for example, Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames 
Still Walk, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1942). See also JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL 
PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1960) (discussing reliance on sociology at the 
University of Michigan Law School).  
 20. Harry T Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). For a discussion of Edwards’s ideas, see the 
symposium in 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1921–2221 (1993).  
 21. RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 85 (1995). 
 22. POSNER, supra note 15, at 2 (“Legal theory is concerned with the practical problems 
of the law, but it approaches them [by] using the tools of other disciplines.”). 
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legal research any less of a science. The history of the natural 
sciences has been scientists using inventions, processes, and 
techniques developed by others to make momentous discoveries or 
create great theories. There is genius in the application of other 
people’s inventions and processes.23 For example, the telescope was 
originally only a curiosity used by artisans to create new illusions. It 
was first marketed as a military device for spying. Then Galileo 
turned a telescope on the heavens and revolutionized the theories of 
astronomy and the nature of scientific scholarship.
24
 Even Einstein 
built his great Special Theory of Relativity on the ideas of others, 
ideas that came close but lacked the insight that Einstein provided. 
The famous mathematician Henri Poincare was the first to identify 
and explain a relativity principle, which he did in the keynote address 
at the International Congress on the Arts and Science held here in St. 
Louis as part of the 1904 World’s Fair. The next year Einstein 
published his brilliant paper on relativity.
25
  
The use of methods from other disciplines is prevalent throughout 
the natural sciences. Geology relies on chemistry and physics; 
biology relies on chemistry; chemistry relies on physics; and physics 
relies on mathematics. It may be that, in this sense, mathematics is 
the only “pure” discipline, not relying on any other.26 So we 
researchers in the law act no differently than researchers in the 
natural sciences when we borrow ideas and methods. Our goal, in 
Mokyr’s terms, should be to show genius in the application of other 
people’s work.  
Interdisciplinary legal scholarship has not only benefited the legal 
academy, it has helped advance scholarship in related fields, like 
 
 23. See, e.g., JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA 15–21 (2002). The Nobel laureate 
Douglass C. North attributed the tremendous growth of technological advancement beginning 
in the late nineteenth century to the systematic practical applications of pure science in what he 
called the Second Economic Revolution, in effect recognizing the importance of engineering. 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 172–73 (1981).  
 24. de Solla Price, supra note 12, at 53–54.  
 25. WALTER ISAACSON, EINSTEIN: HIS LIFE AND UNIVERSE 133–35 (2008); ALBRECHT 
FOLSING, ALBERT EINSTEIN: A BIOGRAPHY, 162–63 (Ewald Osers trans., 1997); RICHARD P. 
FEYNMAN, THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS 15-3.  
 26. FEYNMAN, supra note 25, at 3-1 (“Mathematics is not a science . . . . The test of its 
validity is not experiment.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/9
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economics and political science.
27
 It has reinforced the notion that 
law professors are part of the large community of social science 
scholars. There are also negative consequences that could arise from 
the growth of interdisciplinary scholarship. Part of Judge Edwards’s 
concern was the harm to legal education by the failure of 
interdisciplinary professors to teach doctrine and skills. I share that 
concern, but I am optimistic that law professors—even those with 
doctoral degrees in other disciplines—will not forsake their 
obligation to teach law students how to become lawyers. That means 
teaching the skills needed by lawyers, including case analysis, 
statutory construction, and mastery of legal doctrine. I am also 
concerned about scholars who write only for other scholars, rather 
than trying to improve society or to advance our understanding about 
how the legal world works. There is a danger that writing only for 
other scholars will involve abstract ideas with little relationship to the 
real world or be based on such unrealistic assumptions that it serves 
no other purpose than dialogue with fellow travelers. I believe that 
we are paid to try to improve society with our scholarship, not just to 
have fun with others who share our views.
28
  
Legal scholarship differs from physical science scholarship in a 
number of ways. Edward Rubin explains one difference this way: 
In the natural sciences, virtually everyone agrees that the 
purpose is to describe observable phenomena of the natural 
world. A work that does so correctly is regarded as true and 
thus as a good or excellent work within the field. The criterion 
for truth is the identification of causal relationships and the 
ability to predict the future behavior of events that can occur 
again. . . . Social science in particular—the very name 
bespeaks its aspirations—has long measured its success by the 
same criteria of causation and predictability. 
But the scientific model of validity fails us completely when 
we turn to legal scholarship. . . . Legal scholarship, for the 
 
 27. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1928 (1993). 
 28. Edwards, supra note 20, at 36 (“The law schools should have interdisciplinary 
scholars, but not scholars whose work serves no social purpose at all”). 
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most part, does not share the descriptive purposes of science; 
even purported descriptions of existing law can rarely be 
measured by the criteria of causality or prediction.
29
 
Rubin concludes that we lack an accepted method to evaluate the 
quality of legal scholarship, resulting in a process of evaluation that is 
“essentially intuitive.”30 Thus there is “tendency of legal scholars to 
rate works with which they agree as excellent, and those with which 
they disagree as seriously lacking in analytic perspicacity.”31  
The best-known way to judge research in physical science is to 
ask whether the results can be disproved.
32
 Although some social 
science research strives to meet the falsifiable test, it is often an 
impracticable evaluation method given the impossibility of isolating 
what is being studied from the complexity of the world. This is 
especially true for legal scholarship. In addition, some research is 
validated by commercialization in the market or by grants from the 
government or foundations.
33
 Most legal scholarship is not evaluated 
by the market or by grant awarding organizations; rather it is 
generally financed by deans, with little constraint on quality.
34
 
Everyone knows that student-run journals are poor gate-keepers for 
the publication of quality scholarship. In addition, the obligation of 
nearly all law schools to have faculty who publish regularly has led to 
an avalanche of scholarship. With so many articles and so few 
constraints on quality, it is not surprising that there is so much 
uncertainty about the worth of legal interdisciplinary scholarship.
35
  
 
 29. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 
CALIF. L. REV. 889, 902–03 (1992).  
 30. Id. at 894. 
 31. Id. at 895. 
 32. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 10 (Routledge 2d ed. 2005). 
The Supreme Court has relied on the falsification test as the common method to test scientific 
hypothesis, citing Popper among its authorities. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 
593 (1993) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, 
or testability”) (quoting K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)). 
 33. External validation of scholarship is not a panacea. Journal referees tend to choose 
scholarship that is similar to what they write, while some grant officers have a tendency to 
support what is in vogue.  
 34. Priest, supra note 10, at 1942. 
 35. Richard Posner has said that “a lot of legal theory is vacuous,” POSNER, supra note 15, 
at 1, and that most interdisciplinary legal scholarship is “bad” and “of little value to anyone,” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/9
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Not all legal scholarship is science. A few law professors have 
told me that legal scholarship is properly viewed as part of the 
humanities. Although I prefer to view legal scholarship to be social 
science research, I realize that there is some truth in that perspective. 
A defining characteristic of social science is an attempt to explain the 
real social world. Legal social science attempts to explain the 
relationship between law and the real world—not between law and an 
abstract, artificial or hoped-for world. A substantial amount of legal 
scholarship does not focus on the real social world and therefore is 
not social science. Let me give some examples. 
Some scholarship is exegesis of legal texts, a valuable enterprise 
but one confined to the world of words on a page. Still other 
scholarship is political or social commentary based on the author’s 
view of the world—normative writings. Neither of these is social 
science. Instead, they are the kind of scholarly work that are 
characteristic of the humanities. I would bet that many of the other 
social sciences also include scholars who prefer this kind of research. 
It is a scholar’s own choice whether to write as a social scientist or as 
someone in the arts. Both kinds of scholarship can be valuable. There 
is a danger, however, of being unable to distinguish between the two 
types of scholarship. 
Sometimes casual readers disregard information that shows the 
author’s intent in writing the work; often they are unable to judge the 
validity of work that appears to be social science. It is probably the 
case that some authors are unaware—maybe even unconcerned—
about whether their scholarship is social science or part of the 
humanities. However, the existence of two distinct types of legal 
scholarship may give an inaccurate picture of legal writings, leading 
some readers to accept as true an analysis that is not scientific. In 
addition, most casual observers will lump together all legal 
 
Posner, supra note 27, at 1927–28. However, he puts that in context by noting that scholarship 
is a “high-risk, low-return activity” and that the prevalence of scholarship with little utility is 
the “unavoidable price of a body of creative scholarship.” Id. at 1928. See also Priest, supra 
note 10, at 1942 (“In no field are there positive returns from every investment in basic research. 
Indeed, in terms of successful inventions per attempt, the dominant output of research 
laboratories is probably failure. Theoretical research is a probabilistic process”). For a survey of 
the criticisms of legal scholarship, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 55–58 
(2012). 
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scholarship, never distinguishing between social science and the 
humanities. 
In the mid-80s, Richard Epstein wrote a magnificent book on the 
protection of property rights under the takings clause of the 
constitution.
36
 It was an intellectual tour de force—an elegantly 
reasoned, comprehensive examination of takings opinions and 
scholarship over two centuries. But it was fiction—fiction in the 
sense that it did not deal with reality. Epstein began his analysis by 
stating that he viewed takings law to be based on common law 
principles, with a heavy emphasis on tort law.
37
 He claimed that the 
same legal principles that governed a person’s harm to the property 
of another should also govern the government’s harm to a person’s 
property. However, the two situations differ vastly because the 
government has very different interests at stake than a person who 
harms a neighbor’s property. Epstein never claimed that the Supreme 
Court had ever adopted his perspective. He was clear about his 
starting principles and argued that the takings cases should be 
examined from this prospective. He spent the next 300 pages 
rigorously examining all aspects of takings law from a common law 
perspective—and then reached his conclusion that the New Deal 
legislation was unconstitutional, which is also not true.
38
 It is a 
wonderful book, but it is not a work of social science. 
At the time, the book had great play in academia—especially 
among economists and other social scientists with a conservative 
bent, but not with legal scholars.
39
 I think the supporters liked the 
conclusions about the unconstitutionality of the New Deal. These 
readers did not, however, pay attention to the artificial foundation 
upon which Epstein’s analysis was built, even though Epstein clearly 
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 37. As one commentator observed, Epstein bases these legal principles on “Hobbes’ and 
Locke’s consent theory, then argues that this theory is embodied in the text of the Constitution 
and that the courts ought to enforce that text as written. In view of recent scholarship about the 
origins of the Constitution and the process of constitutional interpretation, this is itself a rather 
antiquated style of argument.” Rubin, supra note 29, at 933.  
 38. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 281 
(1985).  
 39. Rubin, supra note 29, at 935 & n.162 (“The reviews of Epstein’s book . . . [ranged] 
from bewilderment to hostility”).  
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explained this aspect of his work. These readers treated the book as 
an accurate depiction on takings law, when it was not.  
I want to end by returning to Coase’s comment about the law 
being stamp collecting rather than physics. The natural course of 
legal research over the last forty years has been to become more of 
physics than of stamp collecting. However, the study of judicial 
opinions remains an important part of legal scholarship, as it should. 
With the use of methodology and approaches from other disciplines, 
we can expect some of the best legal scholarship to qualify as a 
mixture of both stamp collecting and physics. 
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